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 INTRODUCTION
Consider the anecdote of King Hiero asking Archimedes 
to prove that the amount of gold in his newly made 
crown equals the amount of gold given to the gold-
smiths. Archimedes considers the problem for some 
time, and becomes stuck in an impasse – he simply 
cannot see a solution. Some days later when taking a 
bath, he notices that his body displaces the water in the 
bath tub. Immediately, he has his ﬂash of insight and
runs naked through the streets, crying out “Eureka! – I 
have found it” (Gruber, 1995). Archimedes clearly had 
the necessary knowledge to solve the problem, so why 
was it so hard for him to gain his insight? How was he 
able to overcome the impasse in which he was stuck?
Insight is still a “mysterious” phenomenon within 
problem solving literature. Currently, there are at 
least two theoretical accounts that try to explain the 
processes involved in insight problem solving in or-
der to “demystify insight” (Bowden et al. 2005): The 
ﬁrst stresses the importance of heuristics (MacGregor, 
Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001); the second stresses 
the necessity of a representational change (Ohlsson, 
1992). In this paper we make a further attempt to 
systematically disentangle the inﬂuence of heuristics
ABSTRACT
Insight problems are problems where the prob-
lem solver struggles to ﬁnd a solution until 
* aha! * the solution suddenly appears. Two 
contemporary theories suggest that insight 
problems are difﬁcult either because problem
solvers begin with an incorrect representation 
of the problem, or that problem solvers apply 
inappropriate heuristics to the problem. The rel-
ative contributions of representational change 
and inappropriate heuristics on the process of 
insight problem solving was studied with a task 
that required the problem solver to move two 
matchsticks in order to transform an incorrect 
arithmetic statement into a correct one. Prob-
lem solvers (N = 120) worked on two differ-
ent types of two-move matchstick arithmetic 
problems that both varied with respect to the 
effectiveness of heuristics and to the degree of 
a necessary representational change of the 
problem representation. A strong inﬂuence of
representational change on solution rates was 
found whereas the inﬂuence of heuristics had
minimal effects on solution rates. That is, the 
difﬁculty of insight problems within the two-
move matchstick arithmetic domain is governed 
by the degree of representational change re-
quired. A model is presented that details repre-
sentational change as the necessary condition 
for ensuring that appropriate heuristics can be 
applied on the proper problem representation.
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and representational change  by assessing whether 
the difﬁculty in solving insight problems is due to the
search for proper heuristics that can be applied or 
whether it is due to requiring a change of the initial 
problem representation into a problem representation 
that includes the solution (cf. Jones, 2003). The role 
of heuristics in problem solving will now be examined, 
before covering the insight literature in relation to 
heuristics and to representational change. The goals 
of the current paper will then be outlined.
 Heuristics in problem solving
No one would seriously entertain doubts about the im-
portance of heuristics for problem solving (Gigerenzer 
& Todd, 1999). Most current theorists consider heu-
ristics, or rules of thumb, to be the critical operators 
for the solution of problems (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; 
Mayer, 1992; Lovett & Anderson, 1996; Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998). In particular, the information process-
ing account has strongly emphasized and focused on 
the role of heuristics (e.g., hill climbing, or means-end 
heuristics) as the key for understanding the human 
problem solving process – and this has been demon-
strated successfully for a variety of problems (e.g., 
Newell & Simon, 1972). 
Newell and Simon’s (1972) information processing 
account of problem solving suggests that problem sol-
vers initially generate an internal representation, the 
problem representation, of the given problem, or task 
– the initial state. Problem solving involves applying 
operators to transform the initial state into the desired 
goal state, with a multitude of possible intermedi-
ary states being created along the solution path. The 
closed set of all possible states of a problem is termed 
the problem space. Within the problem space there are 
more or less direct paths from the initial state through 
to the goal state. Newell and Simon suggest that heu-
ristics are used to help the problem solver navigate the 
problem space by the selection of effective operators 
that reduce the distance to the goal much more ef-
fectively than blind trial-and-error. As a general rule, 
Problem Space Theory suggests that the larger the 
problem space, the more difﬁcult the problem.
 The most important heuristics are hill-climbing and 
means-ends analysis (Newell & Simon, 1972; Greeno, 
1974; Thomas, 1974; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; 
Chronicle, MacGregor & Ormerod, 2004). In hill-climb-
ing, the problem solver selects operators that make the 
current state of the problem as similar as possible to 
the required goal state. As a result, there is a tendency 
to select moves that reduce the distance between the 
current and goal states as much as possible. This pat-
tern was consistently found in several empirical studies 
(Greeno, 1974; Atwood & Polson, 1976; Chronicle et 
al., 2004). In means-ends analysis, the problem solver 
reduces the problem into sub-goals and continues to 
create sub-goals until an available operator (means) 
can be applied. Sub-goals are worked off in a stepwise 
manner until the desired goal is attained. 
Although many problems can be described, analyzed 
and solved based on the assumptions of Problem Space 
Theory (Newell and Simon used cryptarithmetic prob-
lems and the Tower of Hanoi problem), these tend to 
be problems that are well-deﬁned (i.e., where it is clear
what the initial state, goal state, and possible moves can 
be). In general, the more ill-deﬁned a problem is, the
more difﬁcult it is to explain in Problem Space Theory,
because it becomes difﬁcult to derive the problem space
and hence apply heuristics to reduce the problem space. 
This is often the case for insight problems, which are 
often regarded as ill-deﬁned. However, some insight
problems are difﬁcult, even though they are well-deﬁned
with clear initial and goal states, and with all of the avail-
able operators to change states in the problem also be-
ing clear. Furthermore, insight problems frequently have 
a small problem space. Problem Space Theory alone 
cannot account for insight problem solving phenomena, 
because its principles do not explain why people reach 
an impasse on clearly deﬁned problems with a small
problem space, and why they require an insight in or-
der to solve them. Hitherto only a few attempts have 
been made to provide extensions for the Problem Space 
Theory in terms of insight problem solving. 
 One possible route of explanation involves the use 
of heuristics, suggesting that a potential failure to 
gain insight is due to the inappropriate application of 
heuristics (MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001). 
Alternatively, another route of explanation is that the 
problem solver fails to generate an adequate problem 
representation, and thus representational change is 
required in order to see the solution (Ohlsson, 1992). 
We will now review the current thinking with respect 
to whether insight arises from people applying inap-
propriate heuristics or whether arises from people 
beginning problems with an incorrect problem rep-
resentation.
Insight: Inappropriate 
representation or inappropriate 
heuristics?
In terms of solving insight problems, solutions 
are: (i) accompanied by an “Aha!” experience 
Heuristics and representational change
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(Bühler, 1907); (ii)  sudden in appearance (Novick & 
Sherman, 2003; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004, Bowden 
et al. 2005); (iii) unintended (Wegner, 2002); (iv) 
not stepwise (Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & 
Wiebe, 1987). 
Aside from this phenomenological description 
of insight, there are a number of researchers who 
propose that insight problems are special because 
they require a representational change (Wertheimer, 
1959; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ohlsson, 1992; 
Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Knoblich et al., 1999). 
According to this view, accomplishing a change in 
one’s representation is the main source of difﬁculty
in achieving insight. Representational change is an 
extension of the Gestalt term “Restructuring” (see 
Ohlsson, 1984a, 1984b), which states that either a 
change of the given constituents of the problem rep-
resentation (“seeing” the problem in another way) 
or a change of the goal representation is necessary 
to achieve insight. 
 For example, an inappropriate problem repre-
sentation that over-constrains the search space for 
a possible solution could be to search for a solution 
within a 2D space when a 3 D representation is re-
quired (e.g., the six-matchstick-problem introduced 
by Katona, 1940). That is, the problem solver’s goal 
representation only enables the selection of operators 
that move matchsticks in the 2D plain (Isaak & Just, 
1995). 
According to Ohlsson’s Representational Change 
Theory, representational change is not the result of 
a deliberate search, but the result of unconscious 
processes that occur when problem solvers get stuck 
in an impasse. An impasse is deﬁned as a mental
state where problem solving behavior ceases and 
the problem solver does not know what to do next. 
To overcome an impasse a representational change is 
necessary. The trigger for a representational change 
is repeated failure due to the constraints of the initial 
problem representation.
 One unconscious process that relaxes self-imposed 
constraints induced by problem solvers’ prior know- 
ledge is termed constraint relaxation. Constraint relax-
ation extends the goal representation of the problem 
solver – e.g., relaxing the 2D constraint in the Katona 
problem and searching in 3D space for a solution. That 
is, the problem solvers’ problem space extends and as 
a result new solution options are available. Empirical 
evidence has shown that constraint relaxation is impor-
tant in the solving of insight problems across a variety 
of domains, such as matchstick arithmetic (Knoblich et 
al., 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson & Raney, 2001; Öllinger & 
Knoblich, 2003), the car-park-game (Jones, 2003), and 
the tumor-problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003). Moreover, 
the principle can be applied to explain the difﬁculty of
many classical insight problems (Ohlsson, 1992; Isaak 
& Just, 1995). 
 An alternative position specifies that the prob-
lem difficulty of insight problems depends on the 
inappropriate application of heuristics (MacGregor, 
Ormerod & Chronicle, 2001; Ormerod, MacGregor 
& Chronicle, 2002; Chronicle et al., 2004). 
The Criterion for Satisfactory Progress Theory 
(MacGregor et al., 2001) focuses on the role heuris-
tics play within the problem solving process using a 
means-ends analysis framework. For the Criterion 
for Satisfactory Progress Theory, the difficulty of 
insight problems is not because of an inappropriate 
problem representation, but due to the application 
of inappropriate heuristics, a view that holds close 
to the assumptions of the original Problem Space 
Theory. The Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory suggests that problem solving follows two 
basic principles: (a) problem solvers seek to maxi-
mize each move such that the move results in a 
state which is as close as possible to the desired 
goal (hill-climbing); (b) problem solvers monitor 
their progress and only select moves that meet the 
criterion of progress – when a selected move fails 
to meet the criterion, there is an impulse to seek 
alternative solutions (c.f. Ormerod et al., 2002, 
p. 792). 
Maximization and progress monitoring are 
thus necessary in order for insightful moves to 
be sought, and these processes trigger the dis-
covery and retention of so-called promising states 
that meet the progress monitoring criterion and 
as a consequence attenuate the problem space. 
Furthermore, promising states lead to the realiza-
tion that novel moves are of potential value and 
as a consequence a re-conceptualisation of the 
problem space is possible. 
The probability of meeting an impasse also varies 
based on a person’s lookahead value. Lookahead is 
determined by the capacity of potential moves a per-
son can “look ahead” and hold in mind, which varies 
across individuals. Insight will be sought more quickly 
for people with a high lookahead capacity because 
they will realize more quickly that the problem at hand 
cannot be solved by the initially applied heuristics. 
MacGregor and colleagues have successfully applied 
the assumptions of maximization, progress monitoring 
and lookahead on the nine-dot problem and the eight-
coin problem (MacGregor et al., 2001; Ormerod et al., 
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2002), and recently on a set of other coin problems 
(Chronicle et al., 2004).
In summary, the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory assumes that insight problems are difﬁcult
because the problem solver applies the wrong heu-
ristics on the given problem representation, whereas 
the Representational Change Theory claims that the 
problem solver manipulates an inadequate problem 
representation.
 The present study
Both theories (Representational Change Theory and 
Criterion for Satisfactory Progress Theory) follow 
the tradition of the Problem Space Theory and both 
try to extend this account to explain insight prob-
lem solving. However, the Representational Change 
Theory assumes that a representational change is 
responsible for overcoming an impasse, whereas the 
Criterion for Satisfactory Progress Theory postulates 
that the realisation of applying an inappropriate heu-
ristic is the trigger for overcoming an impasse. As 
Jones (2003) demonstrated for the car-park game 
and Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) showed for the 
nine-dot problem, it may not be helpful to polarize 
these theoretical approaches, since both of them are 
incapable of explaining the entire problem solving 
process for insight problems. Therefore, it seems 
more fruitful to identify what aspects of insight prob-
lems contribute to the overall problem difﬁculty, and
investigate which parts of each theory best explain 
these contributions. 
The goal of this study is to see whether the main 
source of difﬁculty in insight problems arises from
the need to change the problem representation or 
from the use of inappropriate heuristics. In order to 
examine this, a paradigm was developed in which 
the degree of representational change and the ef-
fectiveness of heuristics can be systematically varied 
at the same time.
 THE TASK
The task is an adaptation of the matchstick arith-
metic problems used by Knoblich and colleagues 
(Knoblich et al., 1999; Knoblich et al., 2001; 
Öllinger & Knoblich, 2003). The assumptions of the 
Representational Change Theory have been em-
pirically validated by this task. Within the match-
stick arithmetic task there are well defined insight 
problems where it is possible to determine the 
problem space (initial state, intermediate states, 
goal state). The great advantage of the matchstick 
arithmetic task is that problems can be constructed 
that have a similar outline, but that require differ-
ing degrees of representational change.
The basic matchstick arithmetic domain presents 
the problem solver with a roman numeral equation 
such as IV – III = III with the task of moving one 
matchstick to make the equation valid. According to 
the Representational Change Theory such a problem 
activates, according to prior knowledge, a goal repre-
sentation that represents the values of the equation 
as variable, whereas the operators (+, –, and =) are 
represented as constants (e.g.: Var1 const1 Var2 const2 
Var3, the prior knowledge hypothesis). This view has 
been supported empirically, with people’s initial eye 
movements being focused on the values in the equa-
tions rather than the operators (Knoblich et al., 2001). 
As a consequence, problem solvers will try to manipu-
late the values to attain the goal (in the example, the I 
of the IV is moved after the V to make VI – III = III), 
but they do not try to manipulate the operators of the 
equation. 
The same goal representation is established for 
the equation VI = III – III. Again, problem solvers 
will manipulate the values, but they will fail with this 
strategy. This problem requires a relaxation of the 
over-constrained goal representation which has to be 
changed to Var1 OP1 Var2 OP2 Var3. That is, the opera-
tors are also considered to be variable and therefore 
the possible search space for a solution becomes larger 
(in the example, one stick of the equal sign is moved 
into the minus sign VI – III = III). The extension 
of the problem solver’s initial problem representation 
marks the moment of insight. Actually, Knoblich and 
colleagues (1999, 2001) found empirically that the 
latter example is signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult than the
ﬁrst. The most difﬁcult problems, however, are equa-
tions of the type VI = VI + VI. This type of problem 
was consistently the most difﬁcult problem in all our
experiments, but why? The problem has two sources 
of problem difﬁculty. First, the constraint that op-
erators are constants has to be relaxed and second, 
the more fundamental constraint that an equation 
per se consists of two different operators has to be 
overcome. After these insights the solution is trivial 
(VI = VI = VI) – a tautological structure is necessary 
to solve the problem. Table 1 summarizes the theo-
retical assumptions and the empirical results of the 
Knoblich et al. (1999, 2001) studies. Note that solu-
tion rate is the inverse measure of problem difﬁculty.
The more solutions to problems, the less difﬁcult the
problem is.
Heuristics and representational change
243
http://www.ac-psych.org
Test problems
For the purpose of the present study, we constructed a 
new set of equations that required varying extents of 
constraint relaxation. Each problem was adapted so as 
to require the problem solver to move two matchsticks 
in order to transform an incorrect arithmetic statement 
into a correct one. We constructed two different types 
of test problems. The test problems always consisted of 
one value-move and one operator-move. For example, 
in the equation IV = III – III, the I of the IV is moved 
after the V to make VI = III – III, and then one match-
stick from the = is moved to make the – into an =, and 
so the solution VI – III = III is attained. Problems of 
this form are designated the Value-Operator type. The 
second type of test problems required the manipula-
tion of a value and an operator to attain a tautological 
structure. For example, in the equation IV = IV + VI, 
the I from the value VI is moved before the V, giving 
IV = IV + IV, and then the vertical matchstick from 
the + is moved to make the + into a second =, so the 
solution has the tautological structure IV = IV = IV 
– designated the Value-Tautology problem type (see 
Table 2). 
The value-move is important – we already know 
from previous studies (e.g., Knoblich et al., 2001) 
that problem solvers will ﬁrst of all look to change the
values in matchstick arithmetic problems. We created 
two different sub-types of Value-Operator and Value-
Tautology problems, each consisting of a different kind 
of value-move. With this manipulation we attempted to 
test the assumptions of the Criterion for Satisfactory 
Progress Theory. 
–Value (minus-value) problems consist of value-
moves that reduce the distance to the goal, support-
ing a pure hill-climbing heuristic. In contrast, +Value 
(plus-value) problems consist of value-moves that 
increase the distance to the goal, violating the hill-
climbing heuristic of the Criterion for Satisfactory 
Progress Theory. 
Let us exemplify this assumption: We assume that 
a perceived efﬁcient heuristic to solve matchstick
arithmetic tasks may be to compare both sides of the 
equation, and select moves that reduce this difference 
as much as possible. That is, confronting the prob-
lem solver with the equation IX = IV – III (9 = 1) 
(a –Value-Operator problem) the difference between 
the both sides of the equation is 8. The question is: 
How can the problem solver reduce this difference? 
She can do this by moving the stick behind the V to be 
in front of it, IX = VI – III (9 = 3). That is, this move 
reduces the distance between the left and the right 
side of the equation by 2. This type of problem satis-
ﬁes a hill-climbing strategy because the value-move
reduces the distance to the goal. 
In contrast, the equation IV = III – III (4 = 0) 
(a +Value-Operator problem) has no available value-
move that reduces the distance to goal. The only avail-
able moves increase the distance to goal – such as VI 
= III – III (6 = 0). After this move, other value-moves 
are available (e.g., VII = III – II, 7 = 1), but these also 
violate the hill-climbing heuristic. This type of problem 
does not satisfy a hill-climbing strategy because the 
value-move increases the distance to the goal. 
We were also able to generate –Value-Tautology 
and +Value-Tautology problems, following the same 
construction rules. As stated previously, the problems 
chosen were all constraint relaxation problems, so one 
of the two solution-moves was a constraint relaxation 
move, which varied in difﬁculty (see Table 2).
It should be noted that it was not possible to control 
the amount of value moves that were possible for each 
equation. For example, the equation IX = VIII – III 
only has one value move available (the I before the 
X) whereas for the equation VI = IV + VI all of the 
‘I’ matchsticks can be moved. This is a point that will 
Problem type Value Type Hybrid Type Operator Type Tautology
Task IX = VII + VI VI = VI + I IV = III - I IV = IV + IV
Solution XI = VII + IV VI = VII - I IV - III = I IV = IV = IV
Goal Repres. Var1 const1 Var2 const2
Var3
Var1 const1 Var2 OP
Var3
Var1 OP1 Var2 OP2
Var3
Var1 = Var2 OP
Var3
Solution rate ++++ +++ ++ +
Empirical 
solution rates ~ 90 % ~ 75 % ~ 60 % ~ 25 %
Table 1. 
Theoretical assumed solution rate of the different problem types. Italic font in the row Goal Representation indicates the loca-
tions in the equation that require changing. The gray shaded goal representation in the column Tautology indicates a deeper 
structural change of the equation. The number of ‘+’ are a qualitative indicator of  the expected solution rate. The empirical 
solution rates comprise the data found by Knoblich et al. (1999, 2001)
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be returned to in the results section where a speciﬁc
analysis that categorizes solution rates in relation to 
available value moves will show that the number of 
value moves available does not affect solution rates.
Baseline problems
We introduced two additional problem types as base-
line conditions. These problem types serve as standard 
comparisons to the test problems, because both base-
line problems require either no constraint relaxation or 
constraint relaxation to a lesser degree than the test 
problems.
Value-Value problems require no constraint re-
laxation, but can be solved by two subsequent value-
moves. For example, in order to solve III = XI – IV, 
there are two value-moves III = IX – IV, and III = XI 
– VI, so the result is III = IX – VI (see Table 3). 
Value-Hybrid problems (see Tables 1 and 3) require 
both manipulating a value and moving a matchstick 
from an operator to a value. For example, in order to 
solve VI = IX + IV, the value-move changes IX into XI 
(VI = XI + IV) and the operator/value move changes + 
into – and VI into VII (result: VII = XI – IV). This prob-
lem type can be characterized as a hybrid between the 
Value-Value and the Value-Operator types.
Basic predictions from Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory 
According to the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory, the problem solver should apply a maximising 
heuristic and therefore prefer moves that reduce the 
distance to goal (–Value problems in Table 2) to moves 
that increase the distance to goal (+Value problems 
in Table 2) (Chronicle et al., 2004). This prediction is 
also supported by studies that investigate the inﬂu-
ence of hill-climbing on multi-step problems such as 
the Hobbit and Orcs problem (Greeno, 1974; Thomas, 
1974), and the water jug problems (Atwood & Polson, 
1976). These studies demonstrated convincingly that 
when the problem solver was required to select moves 
that increased the distance to the goal, these moves 
were very time consuming and error-prone. The stud-
ies demonstrated that move selection is determined by 
the tendency to make the current state as similar to 
the desired goal state as possible – i.e., to reduce the 
distance (or difference) between the current state and 
the goal state as much as possible.
In terms of the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory, problem solvers test against a maximization 
criterion, trying to reduce the difference between the 
left and the right term of the equation. Problems that 
Table 2. 
Examples of the two-step matchstick arithmetic test problems, which entail a standard move (either –Value or +Value) and 
a constraint-relaxation (CR) move (Operator, or Tautology). –Value problems reduce the difference between the terms of the 
equation; +Value problems increase the difference (differences between the left and the right terms of the equation are shown 
in parentheses, with squared parentheses indicating the amount that a move increases or decreases the difference)
Value type CR type Task Value-move CR-move Solution
-Value Operator XIII = IX - VI13 = 3 (10)
XIII = IX - IV
13 = 5 (8) [-2]
XIII - IX = VI
4 = 6 (2) [-8]
XIII - IX = IV
4 = 4 (0)
-Value Tautology IX = XI + IX9 = 20 (11)
IX = IX + IX
9 = 9 + 9 (9) [-2]
IX = XI = IX
9 = 11 = 9 (2) [-9]
IX = IX = IX
9 = 9 = 9 (0)
+Value Operator IX = VIII - III9 = 5 (4)
XI = VIII - III
11 = 5 (6) [+2]
IX - VIII = III
1 = 3 (2) [-2]
XI - VIII = III
3 = 3 (0)
+Value Tautology VI = IV + VI6 = 10 (4)
VI = VI + VI
6 = 12 (6) [+2]
VI = IV = VI
6 = 4 = 6 (2) [-2]
VI = VI = VI
6 = 6 = 6 (0)
Table 3. 
Examples of two-move matchstick arithmetic baseline problems (differences between the left and the right terms of the 
equation are shown in parentheses, with squared parentheses indicating the amount that a move increases or decreases the 
difference)
Problem Type Task Move 1 Move 2 Solution
Value-Value III = XI - IV3 = 7 (4)
III = XI - VI
3 = 5 (2) [-2]
III = IX - IV
3 = 5 (2) [-2]
III = IX - VI
4 = 4 (0)
Value-Hybrid IX = VIII - III9 = 5 (4)
XI = VIII - III
11 = 5 (6) [+2]
IX - VIII = III
1 = 3 (2) [-2]
XI - VIII = III
3 = 3 (0)
Heuristics and representational change
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require the selection of moves that initially increase 
the distance to the goal (i.e., +Value-Operator and 
+Value-Tautology problems) should be more difﬁcult
than problems where the selection of moves reduce 
the distance to the goal (i.e., –Value-Operator and 
–Value-Tautology problems). That is, the Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory expects a better perform-
ance for –Value problems than +Value problems.
It is important to note that the distance to goal ma-
nipulation as described above depends on the implicit 
assumption that the value-move is always selected 
before a constraint relaxation (CR) move (operator-, 
or tautology-move). We already know that problem 
solvers consider value moves ﬁrst (e.g., Knoblich et 
al., 2001), but in addition, solution rates also support 
this assumption (see Table 1). Furthermore, as can be 
seen in Table 2, the CR moves in the –Value problems 
reduce the distance to goal substantially more than 
the CR moves in the +Value problems, so even if peo-
ple made CR moves ﬁrst, the Criterion for Satisfactory
Progress Theory still predicts that –Value problems are 
easier. Nevertheless, an analysis of the type of ﬁrst
move that participants make will be made in the re-
sults in order to verify this assumption.
Note that all of the problems used in each sub-
type are of similar difﬁculty. In the –Value problems
there is a similar distance to goal (–Value-Operator 
(10), –Value-Tautology (11)) and the same holds for 
the +Value condition (+Value-Operator (4), +Value-
Tautology (4)).
Taken together, the prediction of the Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory is that –Value problems 
are easier than +Value problems. The –Value prob-
lems not only reduce the distance to goal in their value 
moves (as opposed to increasing the distance for the 
+Value problems) but their CR moves also reduce the 
distance to the goal much further than the CR moves 
in the +Value problems. Therefore a major difference 
between the effects of the –Value and the +Value con-
dition is predicted. Within each of the conditions, there 
should not be a difference across problem sub-types, 
because each of them reduces the distance to the goal 
by a similar amount.
Basic predictions from the 
Representational Change Theory 
In contrast to the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory, the Representational Change Theory sug-
gests that the difference between the Value-Tautology 
and Value-Operator problems has nothing to do with 
the value-move (–Value, or +Value). That is, for the 
Representational Change Theory, problem difﬁculty is
governed by the amount of constraint relaxation the 
problem type requires, so there should be no differ-
ence in performance for –Value and +Value-moves.
According to the Representational Change Theory, 
problem difﬁculty of the matchstick problems outlined
in Tables 1, 2 and 3 lies in the degree to which con-
straint relaxation is required. Four increasing levels of 
difﬁculty are given (Value-Value, Value-Hybrid, Value-
Operator, Value-Tautology), with Value-Value being the 
easiest and Value-Tautology the hardest. Knoblich et 
al. (1999, 2001) have already found that value type 
problems are solved more often than operator type 
problems, which in turn are solved more often than 
the tautological problems (see Table 1). Subsequently, 
for the two-step matchstick arithmetic problems, 
because the same “amount of difﬁculty” is added
to each problem type (Value, Hybrid, Operator, and 
Tautology), a similar pattern of solution rate is pre-
dicted: Value-Value > Value-Hybrid > Value-Operator 
> Value-Tautology. 
Predictions relating to providing  
a partial-solution
Participants ﬁnd one-move matchstick problems dif-
ﬁcult, and hence we assume that the solution of two-
move matchstick arithmetic problems will also be 
difﬁcult. A partial-solution will therefore be provided
to the participants after a certain amount of time. 
Two different kinds of partial solution can be given: 
ﬁrst, the value move can be shown, or second, the
constraint relaxation move can be shown. Informing 
participants of one move reduces the problem to a 
standard one-move matchstick arithmetic task (see 
Table 1). This means that for the Representational 
Change Theory, providing a CR move should be more 
effective than providing a value move, because the 
CR move reduces the problem to a one-move value 
problem. Providing a value move reduces the problem 
to a constraint relaxation problem and hence the same 
pattern of solution rate should be found as for past 
research: Operator move > Tautology move (Knoblich 
et al., 1999; Knoblich et al., 2001; Öllinger & Knoblich, 
2003).
Predictions for the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory are dependent upon the remaining move to 
be made after the partial solution move is given. If 
a value move is given as the partial solution move, 
then there is a CR move remaining. As can be seen 
in Table 2, the CR moves in –Value problems reduce 
the distance to goal by a much greater amount than 
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the CR moves in +Value problems. The Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory therefore predicts better 
performance for –Value problems than +Value prob-
lems when a value move is given as the partial solution 
move. If a CR move is given as the partial solution 
move, the remaining value move always reduces the 
distance to goal by a factor of two, and so no differ-
ence across problems should be seen for CR moves as 
partial solution moves. In essence then, there should 
be a general performance beneﬁt for –Value problems,
but particularly for –Value problems when a value 
move is given as a partial solution.
METHOD
Design
A 2 (value move: –Value, +Value) x 2 (partial-solu-
tion type: value move, constraint relaxation move) 
between subjects design resulted in four experimen-
tal groups. All groups were shown the (–/+Value)–
Tautology and (–/+Value)–Operator test problems and 
the two additional baseline problems (Value-Value and 
Value-Hybrid). The dependent variables were whether 
the problem was solved either before or after a partial 
solution, for each of the two blocks of problems.
Move veriﬁcation
To verify the assumption that participants initially 
make value moves, the initial moves that participants 
made were recorded. Furthermore, we recorded how 
these moves altered the equation (i.e., whether they 
reduced the distance to the goal or increased it).
Participants
120 participants (37 male, 83 female; age range 17-
36) were recruited by advertising at the University of 
Munich and in local newspapers and received €12 each. 
Participants were screened beforehand for familiarity 
with Roman numerals. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions 
and tested individually. 
Material and apparatus
Twelve Roman numeral matchstick arithmetic prob-
lems were used, each of which could be solved by 
moving two matchsticks in order to transform a false 
arithmetic expression into a correct one. Each par-
ticipant solved six problems, with only four problems 
pertaining to this study. The two remaining problems 
were so-called chunk decomposition problems that 
require a different representational change than 
constraint relaxation problems (see Knoblich et al., 
1999, Ohlsson, 1992). To minimize the inﬂuence of
particular problems, we used two sets of problems: 
Set A and Set B. In table 2 the problems of Set A 
are displayed. For Set B we used similar problems 
that differ in their outline e.g. the Value-Tautology 
problems of Set B were IV = IV + VI and XI = IX + 
XI. For each participant a random order of problems 
was determined. Tables 2 and 3 give examples of the 
types of problem presented.
The study was fully computer-based using a pro-
gram implemented in JAVA (SDK 1.3) and run on a PC 
using Windows98. The problems were displayed on a 
Belina 17” monitor. 
Procedure
All participants were individually tested. Upon entering 
the lab, participants were seated in front of a computer 
screen and given instructions as to how the two-move 
matchstick arithmetic problems should be solved. 
The instructions noted: (1) that all problems could be 
solved by moving exactly two sticks; (2) that sticks 
could not be discarded; (3) that the only valid symbols 
were roman numerals and the arithmetic operators 
“+”, “–”, and “=”. Furthermore, the participants were 
asked to record all their “ideas” and solution attempts 
in a text ﬁeld for notes.
The program display consisted of four horizontal 
areas (see Figure 1). The topmost area presented 
the problem; the second area was provided for par-
ticipants to make notes; the third area was used to 
present a partial solution move if the equation had 
not been solved after ﬁve minutes; and the lowermost
area was used for participants to type in solutions to 
the problems. At the beginning of each trial the par-
ticipants pressed an OK button at which point all text 
ﬁelds were erased and a new matchstick problem ap-
peared. Six keys on the keyboard were labeled “I”, 
“V”, “X”, “+”, “–” and “=”, and these were used for 
making notes and for entering proposed solutions. 
No other keys were functional during the experiment. 
Navigation across the areas was accomplished using 
a mouse.
Each participant worked on all six problems. The 
presentation of the problems was counterbalanced 
across participants. Participants were given ten min-
utes to solve each equation, unless they proposed 
a correct solution before this time limit. Immediate 
feedback was given regarding correct or incorrect 
solution attempts. If participants had not solved the 
Heuristics and representational change
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equation after ﬁve minutes, the partial solution move
gave either the value move or the constraint relaxation 
move (depending upon the experimental condition). If 
participants failed to solve an equation after ten min-
utes, they were shown the solution. 
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We analyzed the results in terms of overall solution 
rates for each condition, solution rates before a partial 
solution move was given, and solution rates after a par-
tial solution move. ANOVA was used for the majority of 
analyses. Although the data has binary characteristics, 
the use of ANOVA is warranted based on the theoretical 
assumptions by Greer and Dunlap (1997), and by its 
successful application by other authors (e.g., Knoblich 
et al., 1999; MacGregor et al., 2001). Finally, we con-
ducted a move-analysis of the participants’ move pro-
posals and ideas recorded in the note ﬁeld (see Figure
1). We classiﬁed the selected moves with respect to
the applied moves of the equation (value move, hybrid 
move, or operator move), and calculated whether a se-
lected move reduced or increased the distance to goal.
Solution rates of the test problems 
before being given a partial 
solution move
Figure 2 shows solution rates for the two test prob-
lems before a partial solution move was given for 
each of the –Value and +Value-conditions. A mixed 
ANOVA with the between-factor Value type (–Value, 
+Value) and the within-factor Problem type (Operator, 
Tautology) showed no main effect of Value type 
[F(1, 118) = 1.54, p > .05]. However, there was 
a highly signiﬁcant main effect of Problem type 
[F(1, 118) = 37.47, p < .001] with Operator problems 
being solved more often than Tautology problems. 
There was no reliable interaction between the two 
[F(1, 118) = .13, p > .05]. 
These ﬁndings suggest that the Value type ma-
nipulation did not inﬂuence problem difﬁculty, and that
it was, in fact, the Problem type that drove problem 
difﬁculty. Thus, for matchstick arithmetic problems,
people’s performance does not seem to be inﬂuenced
by the hill-climbing heuristic. This is further supported 
from the lack of an interaction between the Value type 
and Problem type variables. If both the Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory and Representational 
Change Theory had inﬂuenced problem solving, then
one would expect problems in the –Value-Operator 
condition to be easiest, and problems in the +Value-
Tautology to be the most difﬁcult (i.e., one would ex-
pect an interaction). The lack of a main effect of Value 
type, the lack of an interaction between Value type and 
Problem type, and the fact that there is a main effect of 
Problem type all lead to the conclusion that problem dif-
ﬁculty in these sets of problems depended on the type
and level of constraint that needed to be relaxed.
Solution rates of all problem 
types before being given a partial 
solution move
Figure 3 illustrates the solution rates of the two base-
line problems and the two test problems averaged 
across participants. A one-way ANOVA with the factor 
Problem type revealed a highly signiﬁcant main ef-
fect [F(1, 357) = 19.87, p < .001]. Pairwise post-hoc 
comparisons revealed signiﬁcant differences between
all problem types (p < .05 or better) except the Value-
Hybrid and Value-Operator type (p > .05). This pat-
tern of problem difﬁculty replicated, in principle, the
ﬁndings of the one-move matchstick arithmetic do-
main (see Table 1). The Value-Value type was solved 
more often than any other problem type and the 
Figure 1. 
Display of the user interface
Figure 2. 
Solution rates by condition before a partial-solution was 
provided
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Value-Tautology was by far the most difﬁcult problem
type. Value-Hybrid and Value-Operator problems lay 
in between. The solution rate of two-move matchstick 
arithmetic problems depended on the constraints that 
needed to be relaxed.
 
Solution rates of the test problems 
after being given a partial solution 
move
Figure 4 shows solution rates for the test problems after 
a partial solution was given, broken down by Value type. 
The ﬁgure clearly demonstrates the beneﬁt of giving a 
CR move over a value move as a partial solution move. 
A mixed ANOVA with the two between-factors Value 
type and Partial solution type and the within-factor 
Problem type showed a highly signiﬁcant main effect of
Partial solution type [F(1, 116) = 45.15, p < .001] with 
the CR moves proving more beneﬁcial to solution rates
than the value moves (see Figure 4). There were no 
main effects of Value type [F(1, 116) = 0.51, p > .05] 
or Problem type [F(1, 116) = 1.06; p > .05]. However, 
there was a signiﬁcant interaction between Partial 
solution type and Problem type [F(1, 116) = 6.24, 
p < .05]. That is, the deeper the level of constraint 
that was relaxed by the partial solution, the more ef-
fective the partial solution was. There were no further 
signiﬁcant interactions between any combinations of
the factors (p > .05). 
The results support the partial solution move pre-
dictions of the Representational Change Theory, which 
suggested that giving people the CR move would be 
more beneﬁcial than the value move. The results fail to
support the predictions of the Criterion for Satisfactory 
Progress Theory. There was no difference between –
Value and +Value groups, and there was no signiﬁcant
interaction between value type and partial solution 
type [F(1, 116) = 1.66, p > .05]. Solution rates were 
not higher in the –Value condition when people were 
given the value move as the partial solution move.
Figure 5 shows all problem types (baseline and test 
problems; note that for the Value-Value problem, of 
course, no CR move exists, therefore this problem 
type is not included in the statistical analysis). A mixed 
ANOVA with the between-factor Partial solution move 
(Value move, CR move) and the within-factor Problem 
type (Value-Hybrid, Value-Operator, Value-Tautology) 
revealed a highly signiﬁcant main effect for the factor
Partial solution move [F(1, 118) = 31.20, p < .001] 
with the CR move providing greater beneﬁt to solu-
tion rates than the value move. Furthermore, there 
was a highly signiﬁcant interaction between the fac-
tors [F(2, 236) = 7.87, p < .001]. There was no main 
effect of Problem type [F(2, 236) = 2.23, p > .05]. 
These results show (as do the black colored columns 
Figure 3. 
Problem difﬁculty of test and baseline problems before a
partial solution was given
Figure 4. 
Solution rates of the test problems after providing a partial-
solution. Solution rates are broken down by Value-type
Figure 5. 
Solution rates of the test and baseline problems after pro-
viding a partial-solution. Solution rates are broken down 
by Problem-type
Heuristics and representational change
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in Figure 5) that the greater the degree of constraint 
relaxation a problem type requires, the greater the 
beneﬁt of giving that move as a partial solution move.
Giving a value move as partial solution move results 
in a pattern that is similar to the one-move results (as 
illustrated by the gray colored columns in Figure 5; see 
also Table 1 as a reference). For the Value-Value type 
the participants beneﬁt equally, as would be expected.
Pairwise post-hoc comparisons for the value move as 
partial solution condition revealed highly signiﬁcant
differences between the Value-Hybrid and the Value-
Operator problem types (p < .001). There was no sig-
niﬁcant difference between the Value-Operator and the
Value-Tautology problems (p > .05).
In general the results show that, not surprisingly, 
providing a partial solution move facilitates the solu-
tion of the problems. However, solution rates clearly 
depend on the move type – CR moves are much more 
effective than value moves, at least for the test prob-
lems in this study. This ﬁnding can be summarized:
the more “difﬁcult” the constraint that a partial solution
relaxes, the more a problem solver beneﬁts from the
partial solution. 
Move veriﬁcation
At the outset of this investigation, it was assumed that 
people have an initial preference for value moves. First, 
this was supported from previous studies (e.g., Knoblich 
et al., 1999, 2001) and second, this was assumed for 
the predictions of the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory, although the predictions were not actually de-
pendent on it. In order to check the preference for value 
moves, we analyzed the data recorded in the note ﬁeld
(see Figure 1), where the participants were asked to 
key in all their ideas, proposals, and solution attempts. 
We analyzed the given proposals by counting up the 
type of manipulations that participants applied. In to-
tal, there were 690 inputs in the note ﬁeld. 181 inputs
were invalid, that is, the inputs were not proper equa-
tions (either having a wrong number of values and/or 
operators). Of the remaining 509 equations, 60.89% 
were value moves, 22.47% moves were hybrid moves 
(moves between an operator and a value), and 16.64% 
were operator moves. Even when combining the hy-
brid moves and operator moves, a χ2-test showed that 
signiﬁcantly more value moves were made than other
types of moves [χ2 (1) = 24.21, p < .001]. 
Another area of interest is the direction of the move 
(whether it reduces or increases the distance to the 
goal). The Criterion for Satisfactory Progress Theory 
predicts that people make moves that reduce the 
distance to the goal because they apply a hill-climb-
ing heuristic. Table 4 illustrates the distribution of the 
move types participants used, broken down by the 
experimental conditions (–Value condition and +Value 
condition). The analysis revealed an additional move 
type, labeled neutral moves that do not change the 
difference between the two sides of the equation. As 
Table 4 shows, in the vast majority of cases, partici-
pants selected moves that reduced the distance to the 
goal – supporting the prediction from the Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory.
We conducted χ2-tests for both –Value and +Value 
conditions. Even when combining neutral moves and 
increase moves, the analysis showed that people made 
signiﬁcantly more reduce moves than other types of
move, for both the –Value condition (χ2(2) = 162.40, 
p < .001) and the +Value condition (χ2(1) = 95.19, 
p < .001). A further analysis compared the participants’ 
reduce move preference between the two conditions 
(–Value and +Value). A χ2-analysis revealed a signiﬁ-
cant effect, χ2(1) = 8.55, p = .01, that is, people in the 
–Value condition had a higher frequency of selecting 
moves that reduce the distance to the goal than people 
in the +Value condition.
Number of value moves available
As stated earlier, we were not able to control the 
number of available value moves that participants 
could make in the problems given, and it is conceivable 
that performance systematically varied with the size 
of the given problem space. Therefore, we categorized 
all problems with respect to their number of available 
value moves for the ﬁrst move and determined the
average performance of each category. Figure 6 plots 
the categories and the assigned performance. As can 
Table 4. 
Frequency of different moves that either did not change, increased, or reduced the amount between the left and the right side 
of the equation
neutral-moves increase-moves reduce-moves
-Value 21 (4.13%) 13 (2.55%) 248 (48.72 %)
+Value 24 (4.72%) 16 (3.14%) 187 (36.74 %)
total 45 (8.85%) 29 (5.69%) 435 (85.46 %)
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be seen, there was no systematic increase or decrease 
in performance based on this factor. A linear regres-
sion with the independent variable number of available 
ﬁrst value moves and the dependent variable solution
rate revealed a non-signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcient 
R = .30, (p = .56), illustrating that the number of avail-
able value moves as a ﬁrst move did not affect solution
rates.
The inﬂuence of problem sets A
and B on the solution rate
As mentioned above, we used two different sets of 
problems, A and B. Table 5 illustrates the solution per-
centages for the problems in sets A and B. The two 
sets revealed quite similar results. Again the solution 
rate varied by and large with the extent of the required 
constraint relaxation. A χ2-analysis between the two 
sets revealed no signiﬁcant differences (p > .10).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study we were interested in the possi-
ble interplay of heuristics and representational change 
when solving insight problems. We aimed to contribute 
to the question whether the main source of problem 
difﬁculty of insight problems results from the use of
inappropriate heuristics (MacGregor et al., 2001), or 
from the constraints that problem solvers impose on a 
given problem (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999), 
or as a third possibility, whether both sources have an 
inﬂuence (Jones, 2003). In four groups we varied sys-
tematically the efﬁciency of heuristics and the degree
of necessary constraint relaxation. Our experimental 
manipulation did not reveal any signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
heuristics, going against the predictions of the Criterion 
for Satisfactory Progress Theory. In contrast the solu-
tion rate was clearly driven by the degree of represen-
tational change, as predicted by the Representational 
Change Theory. 
Furthermore, there was, in general, a clear pattern of 
problem difﬁculty (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) that was
rather similar to the ﬁndings of Knoblich et al. (1999) in 
the single matchstick arithmetic domain (see Table 1). 
The more ﬂexible the goal representation has to be, the
more difﬁcult the problem becomes (Value-Tautology
> Value-Operator > Value-Hybrid > Value-Value; read 
“>” as “more difﬁcult than”). Importantly, solution
rates for the Value-Operator problems were essentially 
higher than for the Value-Tautology problems. These 
ﬁndings can only be explained in terms of the neces-
sity of a representational change being crucial for the 
solution of insight problems, and argues against the 
assumption that problem solvers prefer a hill-climbing 
approach that reduces the distance to goal as much as 
possible (Chronicle et al., 2004). 
The results also showed that there was no difference 
across the –Value and +Value groups in terms of solu-
tion rates. Performance was not affected differentially 
by value moves that fulﬁll a maximization criterion that
reduces the distance to goal, in comparison to value 
moves that increase the distance to goal. Under the 
internal criterion of selecting moves that reduce the 
distance to goal, the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory would predict that when solution moves fulﬁll
this criterion, performance should be improved over 
when solution moves do not fulﬁll this criterion. Such
predictions have not been borne out by the data pre-
sented here. 
Examining the baseline problems and the test prob-
lems, the Representational Change Theory claims that 
a more ﬂexible goal representation makes operator
Figure 6. 
Solution rates of the test and baseline problems after pro-
viding a partial-solution. Solution rates are broken down by 
Problem-type
Value-Value Value-Hybrid Value-Operator Value-Tautology
Set A 48.3 36.67 31.67 3.34
Set B 48.3 31.67 40.0 11.67
Table 3. 
Solution rates of the different problem types broken down by problem set
Heuristics and representational change
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problems signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult than hybrid prob-
lems. Interestingly, there was no difference between 
Value-Operator and Value-Hybrid problems. However, 
after a value move was given as a partial solution, 
operator problems were signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult
than hybrid problems, ﬁtting the predictions from the
Representational Change Theory. Clearly, making the 
matchstick problem a two-move problem increases the 
size of the problem space, and this has affected the 
inﬂuence of a more ﬂexible goal representation on the
solution rate. A larger problem space and search space 
had more impact on the problem difﬁculty than the dif-
ferences in the necessary goal representation. This is 
a potential moment where heuristics could become im-
portant, because as the problem space becomes larger, 
people need effective heuristics that help to constrain 
the given problem space (Kaplan & Simon, 1990).
As expected from both theories, providing a partial 
solution move reduced the problem difﬁculty. Providing
either a value move or a CR move increased the solution 
rates, because providing part of the solution reduces 
the problem space. The asymmetry in the performance 
after providing a partial solution move supported the 
Representational Change Theory. A CR move was much 
more effective than a value move. CR moves reduced, 
according to the assumptions of the Representational 
Change Theory, the main source of problem difﬁculty.
CR moves provided the problem solvers with a more 
ﬂexible goal representation than value moves did. In
principle, we also found the predicted pattern of prob-
lem difﬁculty after giving a value move as the partial
solution move – this reduces the problem to a one-
move problem whereby the pattern of problem difﬁ-
culty should be the same as that of previous literature 
(i.e., the more difﬁcult the constraint to relax, the more
difﬁcult the problem is to solve). That is, the necessity
of a more or less ﬂexible goal representation drives
problem difﬁculty. After a value-move being given,
therefore, the solution rate of Value-Hybrid problems 
was, as expected, higher than the solution rate of 
Value-Operator problems. Value-Hybrid problems were 
also easier than the Value-Tautology problems. 
The predictions of the Criterion for Satisfactory 
Progress Theory with regard to providing partial so-
lution moves were not supported. The Criterion for 
Satisfactory Progress Theory argues that when a partial 
solution move is provided, the –Value condition should 
beneﬁt more than the +Value condition. Speciﬁcally,
if a value move is given as the partial solution move, 
then the –Value condition should show an increase in 
solution rates over the +Value condition, because the 
remaining CR move reduces the distance to the goal 
more for the –Value problems. None of the results sup-
ported these predictions. 
A point worth mentioning is that the experimental 
design actually works somewhat against the hypoth-
eses of the Representational Change Theory, because 
there could have been a positive transfer due to the 
partial solutions (see Knoblich et al., 1999). Imagine 
the hypothetical case that a participant in the value 
move partial solution condition was confronted with the 
Value-Tautology problem type as her ﬁrst problem and
she could not solve it. After the upper time limit the 
solution was provided to her, and after obtaining this 
information she knew that the manipulation of opera-
tors and the changing of the common structure of an 
equation were appropriate means to solve a matchstick 
arithmetic problem. Such knowledge should provide her 
with an advantage when solving the remainder of the 
matchstick problems. Taking this into account, the ﬁnd-
ings presented here actually exceed our expectations. 
The analyses of the solution attempts and proposals 
keyed in the note ﬁeld showed clearly that people pre-
ferred moves that manipulate values, as expected by 
the prior knowledge hypothesis of the Representational 
Change Theory. Furthermore, people preferred the 
selection of moves that actually reduce the distance 
to goal, as proposed by the Criterion for Satisfactory 
Progress Theory. Both ﬁndings support our experimen-
tal logic and gave us further insight into the processes 
that are involved in insight problem solving. 
 As often claimed by Knoblich and colleagues (1999, 
2001) some matchstick arithmetic problems are in-
sight problems because they require the problem 
solver to overcome prior knowledge. This follows the 
tradition of the Gestaltists who were the ﬁrst to see
the relationship between the hampering inﬂuence of
prior knowledge and the difﬁculty of solving problems
that actually require overcoming such knowledge 
(Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1930, 1931; Luchins, 1942; 
Wertheimer, 1959; see also Ohlsson, 1984a, 1984b). 
In the matchstick arithmetic task, prior knowledge 
means that people have learned to solve arithmetic 
equations by changing the values of the equation. Now 
we can conﬁrm this assumption, because more than
60% of the moves made were value-moves, although 
people learned more and more operator moves during 
the experiment (see above). Moreover, we can also 
conﬁrm the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress Theory
assumption that people prefer moves that reduce the 
distance to goal. Almost all selected moves reduced 
the distance to goal. This preference was in principle 
independent from the experimental conditions, that 
is, whether problem solvers belonged to the –Value 
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or +Value conditions. However, as mentioned before, 
there is no indication that this preference inﬂuenced
the probability of solving an insight problem. In gen-
eral, the ﬁndings presented here suggest that the
problem difﬁculty of two-move matchstick arithmetic
tasks is not a result of the application of inappropriate 
heuristics, but the result of an inappropriate problem 
representation. 
The Representational Change Theory provides an 
explanation of the insight process that ﬁts in with the
ﬁndings presented here much better than the Criterion
for Satisfactory Progress Theory. The remaining ques-
tion is whether the Criterion for Satisfactory Progress 
Theory and Representational Change Theory can both 
contribute to the comprehension and explanation of 
insight problems. The link between the two theories is 
the fact that a heuristic is likely to be worthless unless 
it is applied to an appropriate problem representation 
(Kaplan & Simon, 1990). While the current paper has 
attempted to demarcate the two theories, a more suit-
able approach may be to suggest that the Criterion 
for Satisfactory Progress Theory explains the phase 
before an impasse, where inappropriate heuristics are 
performed on an inappropriate representation, and the 
Representational Change Theory explains the phase 
within an impasse where the representation is changed 
such that more appropriate heuristics can be applied. 
Jones (2003) came to a similar conclusion – that is, 
insight (the representational change) opens the door 
for the appropriate application of well known strategies 
(heuristics). 
 This way of thinking also accounts for the ﬁndings
presented here. In our view insight depends on an un-
derlying representational change, whereby the process 
of a representational change is by and large an un-
conscious process that seems obviously non-stepwise, 
sudden, and discontinuous (Bowden, 1997; Bowden et 
al. 2005, Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2003; Grant & Spivey, 2003; Jung-Beeman et 
al., 2004; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 
1987; Wegner, 2002). The representational change 
is the door opener that ensures that the appropriate 
heuristics can be applied to the proper problem rep-
resentation. The inﬂuence of heuristics on insight can
sometimes be more important (MacGregor et al., 2001; 
Ormerod et al., 2002; Chronicle et al., 2004) yet at the 
same time, it can occasionally play no major role, as in 
the study presented.
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